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INTRODUCTION
Public policy attempts to improve the "life chances" of youngsters from low
income and minority backgrounds have focused primarily on the schools. "Life
chances" is defined as a child's future ability as an adult to participate fully in
the social, economic, and political life of society. More narrowly, "life chances"
may be considered in terms of such outcomes as ultimate earnings, occupa-
tional status, and political efficacy. The crucial role of the school in preparing
students for these eventualities has been tacitly assumed. It is no surprise,
therefore, that in their quest for greater equality among persons of different
races and social class origins, both policy makers and the courts have devoted
extensive efforts in an attempt to alter the organization and financing of
education.'
There are three principal areas of reform to which policy makers and the
courts have directed themselves in the last two decades: school desegregation,
the provision of additional resources for the education of children from low
income families, and reform of state educational finance systems by reducing
the reliance upon local property wealth as the determinant of local school
expenditures. 2 Each of these reform measures comports with notions of basic
fairness and, indeed, could be defended on these grounds alone. But this view
of reforms-that they are essential in a "just" society-has been overshadowed
by the claim that social science research has shown that the particular educa-
tional strategies offered to the courts enhance the life chances of children.
Educational reform litigation increasingly relies on social science evidence, as
seen in the challenges to school segregation, to the present methods of finan-
cing education, and to student classification policies.
3
This article explores the appropriateness of using social science evidence as
a basis for formulating public policy and for deciding law suits in these particu-
* Professor, School of Education and Department of Economics, Stanford University.
1. See generally D. KIRP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW chs. 4, 6, & 7 (1974).
2. A recent summary of these strategies is contained in STAFF OF SENATE SELECT COMM. ON
EQUAL EDUC. OPPORTUNITY, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT: TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY (Comm. Print 1972). See also J. CooNs, W. CLUNE 111, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970); J. OWEN, SCHOOL INEQUALITY AND THE WELFARE STATE
(1974); Wise, School Desegregation: The Court, the Congress, and the President, 82 SCHOOL REV. 159
(1974).
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lar areas. In the course of this exploration, four questions have to be ad-
dressed: (1) To what degree can social science methodology determine the
impact of schooling on such life chance outcomes as income and occupational
attainment, separating out other factors influencing life chances such as family
background and IQ? (2) To the extent that social science research presents
conflicting theories of these relationships, why do some theories receive consid-
erable attention in the policy arena while others do not? (3) What impact does
social science evidence have on the evolution of law and public policy with
respect to education? (4) Finally, what contribution can the social sciences
make to the issues raised in litigation?
I
EFFECTS OF EDUCATION ON LIFE CHANCES
How might the social scientist attempt to trace the effects of a particular
educational strategy on the life chances of an individual or group of persons?
The difficulties inherent in this task can be illustrated by considering the ftin-
damental characteristics of the problem. At the outset, there is a complex
multitude of psychological, social, genetic, political, economic, and educational
influences that can determine occupational attainments and earnings. The ac-
tual effect of education and of a particular educational environment is particu-
larly difficult to trace because the outcomes that we wish to review are very
much removed in both time and context from the schooling process. Typically,
research in this area is intended to relate the income and occupation of an
individual or a group of persons to the schooling which the\' received many
years before and under circumstances very different from theii present
situations. Also, the educational experiences of an individual are so closely tied
to his social class origin and family experiences that it is virtually impossible
to isolate the distinct influences of each on life chances.
In addressing this issue, social scientists have two basic approaches at their
disposal.4 The first is the purely experimental approach. In theory, an experi-
ment would select persons who were similar in ev ery respect and assign them to
a different quantity and quality of education, and then monitor them over their
life-times in order to determine how the differences in educational experiences
are translated into differences in life-time experience. Such an experiment
would probably require a minimtum of thirty 'ears and would have to ensure
4. Fo tihe best discussion of the expcietital and ijuiasi-CXpe iIetitIIna appioachies itt a eIiated
context see D. CAMPBELL & I. STANLEY, EXPERIMfENTAl AND QUASI-ExiPt RitEf IL DiSI(NS iOR
RESEARC H (1966). For a more skeptical sttemet oil tle ability of social so ictic C research to pl]u ide
proof" ot I a lheor see Address b\ D. Campbell. before the Society for the I'Pst c ological Sltud\ ot
Social Issues meeting with the American Ps' uhological Assotiation. New ( c I lns. La.. Scpt. . 1 974
(to be published in]. SOCIAL Issu- s). S ' /l.o .. KA-IZ, EX' iRisINi TA IkON W H11 HU MAN BEiNC' S: 1 Ill.
AUTHORITY OIF THE INVESTIGATOR, UBJiECIT. PROFESSIONS AND SIAit IN ivie- HUMAN l'f.xt RI-
NENTArLiON PROCESS (1972).
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that the individuals in both the experimental and control groups were treated
identically in their pre-adult years, with the exception of schooling. In other
words, such factors as genetic background, family environment, community
factors, medical care, nutrition, friendships, and so on, would have to be iden-
tical in order to draw an accurate inference about the effects of differences in
schooling.
For obvious reasons, however, such an exercise is impossible. Not only do
we lack the luxury of several decades or a life-time to carry out research for
impending policy decisions, but the conditions that we would have to place on
the human subjects in order to conduct the experiment could very well raise
questions about a violation of their constitutional rights.5 Even were such an
experiment feasible, we would not be able to generalize beyond the actual
educational strategies that were utilized and the specific persons or groups of
persons that were involved in the experiment. Since there are infinite combina-
tions of both, even a relatively large scale experiment would reveal information
about only a limited range of alternatives and population groups. Moreover, in
a society such as ours, the relationship of education to one's life chances is likely
to change from generation to generation, meaning that the results obtained
from a particular experiment might not be applicable to conditions some forty
years later when the experiment was finally completed.
Thus, the most powerful investigative tool that science has to offer for an
understanding of the relationship between education and life chances is politi-
cally and practically infeasible. At best, experimentation can be used to test
minor hypotheses that may be related to some later outcome. 6 For example, it
may be possible to set up an experiment to determine the effect of teachers'
attitudes on student achievement or educational aspirations, assigning students
randomly to two different types of teachers, and holding other factors constant
for the period of the experiment. Outcomes would be measured by stan-
dardized test scores and such elements of educational aspiration as incentive
for further schooling. Even with this more limited type of experiment, it is a
formidable endeavor to fulfill the ceteris paribus conditions. And even more
problematical is the relationship of the experimental outcomes to life success.
One would have to make the assumption that student test scores and attitudes
5. It is Very difficult to explain the experimentation in such precise terms that a layman will
understand the full implications of the testing and thus be able to provide an effective waiver.
Compare the requisite standards for valid consent in the area of medical experiimentation and
research. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health. Civil No. 73-19 434-AW (Mich. Cir. C.,
July 10, 1973) for a judicial response to the legal and medical issues posed hy experimental
psychosurgery. In that case, the court determined that the consent must be competent, volutary,
and knowledgeable. Id. at 31-32. See also Herch & Flower, Medical and Psychological Expeitnentation
on Calijornia Prsoners. 7 U. CAL. DAvis L. REV. 351 (1974).
6. A creative attempt at using experimental methodology to ascertain the effects of intervention
on racial interactions is found in Cohen & Roper, lodijicaltion ol Interracial Inteiactions Disabilit.: An
Application oJ Status Characteristic Theorv. 37 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL REv. 643 (1972).
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are related initially to educational attainment, and ultimately to income and
occupational attainment. While the logic of such a relationship may be com-
pelling, any conclusion in this respect is beyond what could be substantiated
by results from the experiment just outlined.
An alternative social science strategy that is used when direct experimental
research is not feasible is the quasi-experimental approach.7 This latter strategy
represents an attempt to parallel the experimental conditions by using statisti-
cal procedures to "correct" for those factors that cannot be controlled experi-
mentally. Sometimes the quasi-experimental approach is termed a "natural"
experiment because data are collected from an actual life situation rather than
an experimental one. For instance, a researcher who is interested in the effects
of schools on life chances might collect historical data for a sample of adult
males or females. These data would include the present earnings and occupa-
tion of the individuals, information on their parents' class origins, characteris-
tics of the schools that they attended, information on their friends, their work
experience, and so on. A statistical model would then be constructed in an
attempt to determine the relationship between the educational Variables and
the occupational and income attainments of the sample being studied.
Quasi-experimental studies attempt statistically to relate all relevant factors
that might explain a particular phenomenon. The success of such an approach
is dependent upon the ability to identify and measure these factors and to
relate them in the statistical analysis in a manner reflecting the true phenome-
non. As mentioned previously, however, there are an unlimited number of
potential influences on adult outcomes and there are a variety of plausible ways
that each can be measured and'related to other variables in the analysis. In an
area where choices must be made among the myriad of possible variables, mea-
sures, and relationships, the complexity and arduous nature of this type of
statistical analysis necessarily limits the researcher to a narrow set of alternative
formulations. The actual choice of factors to be included in a study, the mea-
sures of those that are ultimately selected, and the structure used to relate them
is in part determined by the personal predilections of the researcher.8
In summary, there are enormous difficulties in determining how a host of
genetic, psychological, social, cultural, political, economic, educational, and
chance factors determine a person's ultimate life attainments. These difficulties
and the complex nature of the problem suggest the inability of social science
research to derive answers that can be utilized with any reasonable degree of
reliability. Indeed, it is little wonder that opinions on the subject differ as much
among social scientists as they do among laymen. Because of the inherent
inadequacy of our present tools, there is no social science concensus on the
7. See D. CAMPBELL & J. STANLEY, supra nole 4.
8. See generally Levin, The Social Science Objectivity Gap, 55 SATURDAY REV. no. 46, at 49 (1972).
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appropriate educational strategies for improving the life chances of children
from low income and minority backgrounds. 9
1I
HYPOTHESES ABOUT SCHOOLING AND ADULT ATTAINMENTS
The fact that social science has not provided a definitive or even a tenta-
tively acceptable analysis of the relation between schooling and adult attain-
ments does not mean that there exist no hypotheses on the subject. To the
contrary, there are at least four such theories relating schooling to eventual
adult occupation and income. Each of them presumes a relatively different
educational approach toward improving the life chances of disadvantaged stu-
dents.
A. Skills or Cognitive Achievement
Much of the literature on schooling and adult income is dominated by the
notion that education produces verbal and mathematical skills as well as other
knowledge that translate into higher productivity in the market place and con-
sequently higher earnings. Under this hypothesis, the more cognitive knowl-
edge that children acquire in school, the greater will be their life attainments.
Accordingly, the effect of schooling or income is determined by the effect
that schooling has on skills and knowledge. Those schools that contributed
toward greater gains on achievement tests ostensibly would have the greatest
impact on improving the future adult attainments of their pupils. Hence, the
appropriate educational strategies would be those that are consistent with
increasing the test scores of children from low income backgrounds. The most
notable of these approaches is the provision of additional educational re-
sources as exemplified by programs of compensatory education in the ele-
mentary and secondary schools"t and such pre-school programs as Project
Head Start." It has also been argued that greater social class and racial inte-
gration of schools will have this effect.' 2
9. See Address by D. Campbell. supta note 4.
10. In addition to programs under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20
U.S.C. § 241 (1970). several states provide funds for compensatory programs. See, e.g., CAL. FDUC.
CODE §§ 6499.230-6499.238 (West 1975); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.90-115.94 (Supp. 1974).
11. Project Head Start, instituted under authority of title 11 of the Economic Opportunity Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 516 (1964), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2781 (1970), offers a variety of health, social
and educational services to enable pre-school children from deprived families to enter kindergar-
ten or first grade.
12. See Coleman. Toward Open Schools, 9 PUB. INTRESt 20 (Fall 1967).
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B. Noncognitive Characteristics for Work Relations
In contrast to the cognitive achievement hypothesis outlined above, the
second thesis views the school as inculcating students with the appropriate
behaviors for occupying particular positions in the occupational or organiza-
tional hierarchy. Such characteristics as respect for rules, dependability, and
internalization of the norms of the workplace have been found to be strong
predictors of employee ratings by supervisors and of income levels."l The
workplace is seen as a hierarchically differentiated organization in which dif-
ferent positions require varying worker characteristics: 4
those at the base of the hierarchy requiring a heavy emphasis on obedience and
rules and those at the top, where the discretionary scope is considerable, re-
quiring a greater ability to itake decisions on the basis of ws ell-internalized
norms. This pattern is closely replicated in the social relations of schooling.
Note the wide range of choice over curriculum, life style, and allocation of time
afforded to college students, compared with the obedience and respect for
authority expected in high school.
According to the second hypothesis, while minimal skills are necessary for
productivity, most of the discrepancy in occupational attainment and earnings
is attributable to noncognitive work traits. Four of these work prerequisites
-proper level of subordination, discipline, supremacy of cognitive over affec-
tive modes of response, and motivation according to external reward
structures-have been identified.1 5 Also identified are the wvays in which the
schools are structured to foster these traits. For example, subordination and
proper orientation to authority along hierarchical lines are necessary in virtu-
ally all modern work enterprises. Thus, "[a]s the worker relinquishes control
over his activities on the job, so the student is first forced to accept, and later
comes personally to terms with, his loss of autonomy and initiative to a teacher
who acts as a superior authority, dispensing rewards and penalities." 'i Sini-
larly, it is argued that other school practices are related to the requirements of
the workplace; students from lower social class origins are being prepared to
occupy lower status occupations and those from higher class backgrounds are
being socialized to undertake professional and managerial roles.
This hypothesis suggests that the contribution of schooling should be
evaluated in terms of its impact on creating productive worker characteristics.
UnforttInatelv, the work hierarchy is so unequal in terms of job requirements,
satisfaction, income, and prestige that providing everyone with the "most pro-
ductive" traits is not likely to increase life chances for everyone. Rather, it
13. See R. Edwards. Alienation and Inequality: Capitalist Relations of Production in a Bureau-
cratic Enterprise, July 1972 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Departmuent of Enoniics. Harvard Univer-
sity).
14. BowlIs, Undeostanding Unequal Economic oppritunity. 63 Aw. EcoI . Rv. 346. 353 (1973).
15. Gintis. Education, Technologyv and the Charaeteriics j lorker Produtivity, in Pmneeding.u (J the
Eight -Fourh Annual Meeting. 61 Axi. ECON. RE%,. 266 (1971) [hercinafter (-itedt as Gintis].
16. Id. at 274.
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would simply redistribute opportunities among the population with some indi-
viduals improving their standing and others losing ground in terms of produc-
tive adult roles. In contrast with the thesis that everyone's productivity is en-
hanced by the attainment of greater cognitive skills, it is difficult to argue that
productivity for all individuals would rise with the inculcation of higher eche-
lon occupational traits, so long as the number of such positions is rationed by
the occupational pyramid. In short, the view that the schools affect the life
chances of students by preparing them for particular levels of the work hierar-
chy suggests that schools perform their function when they differentiate and
produce the highly unequal outcomes that correspond to adult roles.' 7 The
most that could be accomplished by the schools in such a world is that students
from disadvantaged backgrounds would have the same chance to be prepared
for particular roles as those from advantaged backgrounds, in contrast with the
present system which relegates racial minorities and the children of the lower
class to corresponding lower class adult roles.
C. Screening and Certification
The third major hypothesis of how education affects earnings and occupa-
tional status views the school as an organization whose principal function is to
sort and select students. According to this interpretation, the schools carry out
a sophisticated process of assessing the cognitive and personal attributes of a
student and then assigning him to a particular educational fate. Through test-
ing, ability grouping and tracking, curriculum assignment, grading systems,
and stratification by social class among neighborhoods, the schools act as an
enormous filter.18 Students who have the low-level skills and personality
characteristics suitable for the lower end of the work hierarchy are placed in
slow ability tracks or in inner-city schools that provide them with little incen-
tive for further schooling. In contrast, students with high test scores and with
personality attributes that correspond with the upper level of the job hierarchy
are encouraged to pursue further education and will be rewarded with the
high grades which represent the admission requirement for obtaining su-
perior educational credentials.
The screening and certification hypothesis assumes that the occupational
and income attainment process for an individual is determined largely by the
amount of schooling he has received, his field of study, and the prestige of
the institutions that he attended.' 9 Thus, the sorting and selection of each stu-
17. See Levin, A Conceptual FrameworkJor Accountability in Education, 82 SCHOOL REv. 363 (1974).
18. See I. BERG, EDUCATION AND JOBS: THE GREAT TRAINING ROBBERY (1970); Hall, On the Road
to Educational Failure: A Lawyer's Guide to Tracking, 12 INEQUALITX IN ED. 1 (1970); Kirp, Schools as
Sorters: The Constitutional and Polic'y Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705
(1973); Sorgen, Testing and Tracking in Public Schools, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1129 (1973). Use of the term
"fiter" is adopted fron Arrow, Higher Education as a Filter, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 193 (1973).
19. See generally Bowles, Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor, in
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dent according to his initial and developing characteristics are identified in
the job market by an educational credential which is used to establish his place
in the occupational structure. Since such credentials are awarded on the basis
of "productive" characteristics, employers need only to find out which "certifi-
cate" an individual possesses in order to judge his suitability for a particular
position.2 0 The hypothesis thus suggests that schools do not serve to educate
students but instead to select them for their future fates according to charac-
teristics derived from their genetic heritage and non-school environments. It
has been further argued that the traits used for selection have little to do with
real productivity differences and that persons with higher educational creden-
tials are simply placed in jobs that are ostensibly more productive because of
such factors as, for example, greater capital investment per worker.2 1
Presumably, then, the reason that children from lower income and minority
backgrounds do more poorly in both schools and later careers is that they are
filtered out rather early on the basis of low initial test scores and personality
traits deemed inappropriate for further educational selection. Their low educa-
tional credentials mean that they will occupy low productivity jobs with little
hope of access to the more productive and remunerative ones.22 The educa-
tional policy implications of this hypothesis are not unlike those of the second
hypothesis discussed earlier, which is concerned with the noncognitive charac-
teristics or behavior appropriate at various levels. In both instances, the schools
tend to reinforce the initial attributes of students; according to the third
hypothesis, through selection and certification procedures, and according to
the second hypothesis, through selection, differentiated preparation by cate-
gory of student (especially social class), and certification. The major distinction
between the two views of the educational process is that the sorting hypothesis
assumes that the school has no educational effect on the student and that the
observed differences merely reflect variation in natural endowments and out-
of-school influences. The noncognitive socialization theory, on the other hand,
assumes that schools do have an effect-that of further reinforcing these initial
differences.
Only by eliminating all sorting and selection based on characteristics that
coincide solely with race and social class will educational credentials be distri-
buted in a more nearly random manner. Yet, since grades and examination
scores are based substantially upon behavior and language styles which in turn
are heavily determined by racial and social class backgrounds, drastically dif-
SCHOOLING IN A CORPORATE SOCIETY 36 (M. Carnoy ed. 1972); Karabel, Community Colleges and
Social Stratification, 42 HARV. ED. REV. 521 (1972).
20. See Arrow, supra note 18; Spence,Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973).
21. See Thurow, Education and Economic Equality, 28 PuB. INTEREST 66 (Summer 1972); I. BERG,
supra note 18.
22. See D. GORDON, THEORIES OF POVERTY AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT (1972). See also Harrison,
Education and Underemployment in the Urban Ghetto, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 796 (1972).
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ferent criteria would have to be developed for determining a student's educa-
tional success.
D. Reduction of Social Class and Racial Frictions
The final hypothesis considers the attitudes of all students towards racial
and social class differences. The premise is that the better all racial and social
class groups understand each other, and the greater the number of intergroup
contacts, friendships and interactions, the less racial and class conflicts there
will be in adult life. 23 The role of the school in this regard is crucial, for racial,
cultural, and social class diversity in the educational environment is considered
to be a prerequisite to greater justice in the distribution of jobs and earnings
among the population. It is assumed that such a policy would have a marked
impact on reducing labor market discrimination against racial minorities and
members of the lower classes.
The obvious educational strategies that are consistent with this hypothesis
are those which lie at the heart of the school desegregation movement. These
include greater social class and racial heterogeneity among students and the
introduction of a more multi-culturally oriented curriculum. The former
action would be accomplished through massive desegregation of schools,
thereby increasing the diversity of student populations and of the resultant
educational and social interactions. The latter approach, which emphasizes a
greater balance among the cultural contributions of different social and racial
groups, would be implemented through changes in instructional materials,
teacher training, and teacher selection.
III
EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE HYPOTHESES
According to the conventional image of science, mere application of re-
search methodology to competing hypotheses will reveal which one best de-
scribes the world. Thus, through the use of sophisticated empirical research
techniques we should be able to distinguish among those approaches worthy of
elevation to the level of explanatory theory and those which should be banished
23. Contacts that bring knowledge and acquaintance are likely to engender sounder beliefs
about minority groups .... Prejudice ... may be removed by equal status contact between
majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly
enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom, or local
atmosphere), and if it is of a sort that leads to the perception of common interests and
common humanity between members of the two groups.
G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 268, 281 (1954); see M. DEUTSCH & M. COLLINS,
INTERRACIAL HOUSING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT (1951); J.
DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN TOWN (1937); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA
(1944). But see Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INTEREST 90, 102-05 (Summer 1972);
Armor, The Double Double Standard: A Reply, 30 PUB. INTEREST 119, 127-29 (Winter 1973).
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as falsehood. But, as noted previously, the tools of social science are inadequate
for this task. The social science evidence that does exist is incomplete, frag-
mented, and applicable to narrow populations only. It cannot, therefore, be
conclusive.
24
Although each hypothesis can be shown as consistent with some observable
facts, the same facts often lend support to more than one of the hypotheses.
Table I represents a summary of the evidence in support of the four hypoth-
eses linking education with the life chances of poor and minority students. The
educational strategies and the measures of educational outcome that are consis-
tent with each hypothesis are shown in this table. But beyond this, the impor-
tant concern is whether certain specified educational outcomes have been pro-
duced successfully by the corresponding educational strategy. The extent to
which the desired educational outcome is linked to such adult attainments as
income and occupational status is of substantial concern as well. These aspects
are essential to determining the degree to which we can expect a particular
educational strategy to produce enhanced income and occupational positions.
Accordingly, the summary of the evidence linking the educational strategy to a
specified educational output, and the educational output to measures of life
attainment is also provided in Table I. It is important to observe that a lack of
evidence for the impact of any particular strategy does not mean that the
approach is without merit. It simply means that existing research-which may
be quite minimal on the subject-has not provided sufficient empirical support
for such a strategy.
A. Measures of Educational Outcome
The cognitive skills hypothesis has as its measure of educational outcome
standardized test scores. Despite the fact that there are many and diverse
measures of the broad range of cognitive skills, the evidence, as indicated
below, is remarkably consistent whether IQ tests, achievement tests, reading
tests, mathematics tests, or others are used. In order to raise the level of
cognitive performance of low income and minority youngsters, the educational
strategies usually invoked are the provision of greater resources for compen-
satory education and racial and socioeconomic integration. The evidence is
weak that either of these policies has significant impact on test scores. For
example, neither the Coleman Report2 5 nor subsequent studies, some of which
used the data collected for the Coleman Report, found that differences in the
level of educational resources have any major impact on test scores. 26 An
analysis based on the statistical results of a number of these studies has shown
that even major increases of those educational resources most related to test
24. See Address of D. Campbell, supra note 4.
25. J. COLEMAN, EQUALIVY OF EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY (1966).
26. See, e.g., C. jEN(CKS, INEQUALITY 93-95, 255 (1972) [hereinafter cited asJENcKs].
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scores would not come close to eliminating the performance gap between white
and black students. 27 Evaluations of compensatory education programs carried
out under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196528
similarly have been unable to demonstrate any significant relationship between
increased resources and improved test scores. 29
While some studies have suggested that both socioeconomic and racial in-
tegration improve the test scores of minority and low-income students, 30 these
conclusions have been contested in other evaluations.3 1 Thus, neither compen-
satory education strategies nor those related to desegregation show anything
other than a weak relationship to cognitive gains. Even when statistical differ-
ences in favor of these strategies are reported, the improvement in cognitive
skills is generally marginal.
Assuming that strategies other than compensatory education and racial and
class integration could be found which did improve cognitive scores substan-
tially, what would be the impact of such an improvement on income and occu-
pational attainments of poor and minority youngsters? Numerous studies
demonstrate a consistent statistical relationship between test scores and these
measures of life success. 32 The explanatory significance of this relationship is
27. Carnoy, Is Compensatory Education Possible?, in SCHOOLING IN A CORPORATE SOCIETY 175
(M. Carnoy ed. 1972).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
29. See, e.g., M. Wargo, G. Tallmadge, D. Michaels, D. Lipe, & S. Morris, ESEA Title 1: A
Reanalysis and Synthesis of Evaluation Data From Fiscal Year 1965 Through 1970, March 1972
(unpublished document on file at American Institute for Research, Palo Alto, Cal.); Levin, Effects of
Expenditure Increases on Educational Resource Allocation and Effectiveness, in SCHOOL FINANCE IN
TRANSITION 177 (J. Pincus ed. 1974). A stud), prepared by the Rand Corporation acknowledges
that "[v]irtually without exception, all of the large surveys of the large national compensatory
education programs have shown no beneficial results on average." THE RAND CORPORATION, How
EFFECTIVE IS SCHOOLING? 124-25 (1971). The study, however, is quick to note that "the evaluation
reports on which the surveys are based are often poor and research designs suspect." Id. at 125.
The caveat points to such factors as non-random assignment of children, bias in project selection,
"continuation" of the questionable evaluation procedures. Id. at 106-07. Consequently, "no ...
assurance is possible . .. that the survey evaluations used in arriving at such a verdict were
themselves an accurate description of the real world .... -Id. at 105.
30. See J. COLEMAN, supra note 25; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS. RACIAL ISOLATION IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967); Pettigrew, Useem, Normand, & Smith, Busing: A Review of "'The
Evidence," 30 PUB. INTEREST 88 (Winter 1973).
31. See Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INTEREST 90 (Summer 1972); Bowles & Levin,
The Determinants o] Scholastic Achievement-A Critical Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence, 3 J. HUMAN
RESOURCES 3 (1968); Cohen, Pettigrew, & Riley, Race and the Outcomes of Schooling, in ON EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 343 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972); Hanushek & Kain, On
the Value of Equality of Educational Opportunity as a Guide to Public Policy. in id. at 116; St. John,
Desegregation and Minority Group Performance, 40 REV. ED. RESEARCH 111 (1970); Smith, Equality of
Educational Opportunity: The Basic Findings Reconsidered, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY, supra at 230.
32. See, e.g., D. DUNCAN, D. FEATHERMAN, & B. DUNCAN, SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND
ACHIEVEMENT (1972); JENCKS; T. Ribich & J. Murphy, The Economic Returns to Increased Educa-
tional Spending, 1974 (to be published in J. HUMAN RESOURCES); P. Wachtel, The Effect of School
Quality on Achievement, Attainment Levels and Lifetime Earnings, May 1974 (unpublished paper
at the New York University Graduate School of Business Administration); Griliches & Mason,
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nonetheless quite weak.3 3 At most only about 10 per cent of the differences in
income can be explained by test scores, leaving 90 per cent or more to be
explained by other factors. Furthermore, relatively large increases in test
scores are associated with only modest increases in income. While the apparent
effect of test scores on occupational status is somewhat higher, it still only ex-
plains-at the most-about 25 per cent of the variance.3 4 Differences in test
scores, therefore, are not a major factor in explaining why occupational at-
tainments and incomes differ among various cross sections of the population.
In summation, the hypothesis that improving the cognitive test scores will raise
the adult attainments of children from low income and minority families shows
little promise of success because (1) available educational strategies have not
demonstrated much success in improving test scores of these students and (2)
increases in test scores show only modest effects on adult income and occupa-
tions.
B. Evidence on Noncognitive Work Characteristics
In contrast with the numerous studies exploring the relationship between
test scores and increased resources or integration, there are few research
studies devoted to the other hypotheses. Nonetheless, there have been some
attempts to explore the noncognitive worker characteristics thesis. As indicated
previously, the measure of educational outcome relating such traits to income
and occupation are those values, attitudes, and behaviors which are required
for work positions in a hierarchical setting. These include such characteristics
as dependability, subordination to authority, respect for rules, and internaliza-
tion of work norms.3 5 Measures of noncognitive work traits have been demon-
strated to be related to grades awarded by teachers, more so than are test
scores.36 However, there is apparently no study which has attempted to deter-
mine the degree to which the worker characteristics of poor and minority stu-
dents can be altered by compensatory education or integration. Contrariwise,
there is a strong presumption that the present approach will resist change
because it is functional to the reproduction of the capitalist work hierarchy.3 7
Accordingly, the relationship between the educational strategy and the desired
educational outcomes must be considered as weak.
Education, Income, and Ability, 80J. POL. ECON. 574 (1972); Sewell & Hauser, Causes and Consequences
of Higher Education: Models of the Status Attainment Process, 54 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 851 (1972);
Taubman & Wales, Higher Education, Mental Ability, and Screening, 81 J. POL. ECON. 28 (1973).
33. See Bowles & Nelson, The Inheritance of IQ and the Intergenerational Reproduction of Economic
Inequality, 56 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 39 (1974).
34. See generally 0. DUNCAN, D. FEATHERMAN, & B. DUNCAN, supra note 32; JENCKS; Bowles &
Nelson, supra note 33; Griliches & Mason, supra note 32; Sewell & Hauser, supra note 32.
35. See, e.g., R. Edwards, supra note 13; Bowles, supra note 14; Bowles & Gintis, IQ in the U.S.
Class Structure, 3 SOCIAL POLICY 65 (Nov./Dec. 1972, Jan./Feb. 1973); Gintis.
36. See Gintis.
37. See Bowles, supra note 14; Bowles, supra note 19.
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There is, however, evidence linking noncognitive outcomes to income and
occupational attainments. The amount of schooling a person receives is a more
powerful determinant of income and occupation than are test scores. For ex-
ample, three studies using longitudinal data-permitting prior schooling ex-
periences and test scores to be linked to earnings-have found either a non-
existent or a relatively negligible correlation between test scores and earnings.
This is in contrast to the rather pronounced impact that the amount of school-
ing has on ultimate income.3 8 Thus it appears that the amount of schooling a
person receives has a considerable effect on adult success, independent of the
cognitive skills attained from the educational process.
But there is additional evidence supporting the noncognitive work charac-
teristics hypothesis: teachers tend to award higher grades to students who
exhibit personality characteristics functional in the work hierarchy.3 9 One study
of a sample of workers from three different enterprises found that these per-
sonality traits or characteristics are related both to supervisors' ratings and to
earnings, even after differences in cognitive skills among employees is ac-
counted for.40 Obviously, much more research is needed in this area, but the
view that noncognitive educational outcomes have more important influences
on life attainments than cognitive ones has considerable support. Nevertheless,
the lack of evidence indicating that educational strategies can alter the distribu-
tion of these traits suggests that the policy implications of this hypothesis are
minimal.
C. Evidence on Sorting and Selection
The difficulty in evaluating the sorting and selection hypothesis is that there
is virtually no reliable way to distinguish its effects from those generated by the
cognitive and noncognitive socialization hypotheses. Essentially, the difference
between the sorting and selection hypothesis and the other two is that the
former assumes that schools do not produce the cognitive and noncognitive
traits that are reflected in educational attainments and credentials. Rather,
schools simply identify and select students according to those traits which they
already possessed or acquired outside of the school setting, and bestow upon
them differing educational rewards. Whether schools sort according to
already-existing characteristics or actually inculcate these characteristics in stu-
dents cannot be determined without very intensive studies. Possibly both as-
pects are prevalent but there is no apparent evidence that permits differentia-
38. See T. Ribich & J. NIurphy,.ipra note 32: P. Wachtel,.supta note 32. Ses ell & Hause, rsupa
note 32. Even when test scores are inCluded n the analysis, the effet of schooling alone on
earnings is not significantly reduced. See Boxles. ,upo note 14; Ginfis; Griliches & Nason, supra
note 32.
39. Set Gintis.
40. See R. Edwards . pia note 13.
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tion between the two. 4 ' Thus, any evidence tending to support the cognitive
and noncognitive socialization hypotheses would certainly be consistent with a
sorting and selection hypothesis as well.
D. Evidence on Reduction of Frictions Between Races and Classes
Finally, the hypothesis on reducing racial and social class frictions measures
educational outcome by the attitudes of representatives of each group towards
themselves (self-image and sense of efficacy), as well as by attitudes that con-
note an understanding and acceptance of members of other groups. Whether
the educational strategies of desegregation and muti-cultural emphasis 42 have
long-run effects on attitudes and behavior is questionable. That the evidence in
these areas is both controversial and contradictory is reflected in recent debates
on the subject.4  In some instances desegregation of the schools appears to
have improved the self-images of racial minorities and racial attitudes of both
majority and minority students; 44 in other cases there seem to have been no
effects, or even negative ones.' 5 One of the basic problems that pervades this
research is the qJuestionable reliability and stability of any measure of human
attitudes. Given the variable quality of desegregation efforts and multi-cultural
educational programs, it is not surprising to find such a divergence of results.
There is at least some empirical evidence supporting the view that
socioeconomic integration improves the life chances of low status children. An
analysis of data collected for a sample of youngsters then in the ninth grade,
supplemented by follow-up information on their subseqluent schooling, occupa-
tional attainments, and income nine years later, indicates that students who had
similar test scores and social class backgrounds as well as educational attain-
ments had higher incomes if the, had attended secondary schools with other
students from high socioeconomic backgrounds. 46 A particularly interesting
aspect of this study was that low status Individuals appeared to "gain" more
than twice as much income from this effect as did the high status individuals.
However, even this finding applies only to the young adults in this particular
-l. A jeltced qiIcsiil is te degiee to which educational credentials reflect differences in
pr olductivity Is I)I) Std I0 thenr iilt in s(iCeiling nIpIiees fr m i) j ti iIilar occupat ional positions
awilihiui regard [0] prodl clivily. Conpare Ta biiin & Wales, upia note 32, with La ard &
Psat haopotUlos. The S ,? eining Hypothesis and ti Rdtu in to Lduiati,,. 82 J. Pot EtoN. 985 (1974).
42. See text at p. 226 supia.
43. See Armnior. supa note 31 . Arimor. supia note 23; Petigrew, Useem, Normand. & Smith.
supia note 30.
44. See G. AllPoR, suapia note 23; M. DEUTSCH & M. COLLINS, supia note 23; J. Dot LARD, supia
note 23; G. MiRDAL supra note 23. See also Epps, The Impact o School Desegregation on Aspirations,
SelfConcepts an(d Other Aspects of Peiso ahty. 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. no. 2. at 300 (1975) for a
review of the rescaich on tile impact of desegregation on self-esteem, and Cohen. The Effects J
Deeu'egatioi on Race Relations. 39 LAW & CONiEMP. PROB. no. 2. at 271 (1975) for a review of the
research oit the impact of desegregation on interracial relations.
45. See Arnor, supra note 23.
46. See T. Ribich & j. \fil phy, supra note 32.
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sample. Furthermore, it is not clear why socioeconomic composition per se
should lead to higher incomes.
IV
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE CHOICE OF A STRATEGY
The difficulty of using social science research to determine how different
educational strategies can be used to affect the future life chances of low
income and minority students is clear. While virtually all of the four hypotheses
discussed above have some support, the results are ambiguous and inconclu-
sive. Advocacy of any particular approach, therefore, is not based so much
upon its general acceptance in the scientific community as it is upon the pre-
dilections of researchers and policy makers. The fact that they as well as the
courts have not been neutral among competing ideas suggests that it is useful
to explore the reasons that particular strategies are selected.
At the outset, one may very well ask how social science researchers can
commit themselves to a particular hypothesis or approach on the basis of am-
biguous, fragmented, and often contradictory findings. The answer, seemingly,
is that researchers often have commitments based upon deeply ingrained social
experiences that affect their understanding of how society functions. The
natural consequence of these experiences encourages the social scientist to
accept the evidence which reinforces his own experience and to be skeptical of
that which does not. 47 As Polanyi has noted: 48
I start by rejecting the ideal of scientific detachment. In the exact sciences, this
false ideal is perhaps harmless, for it is in fact disregarded there by scientists.
But we shall see that it exercises a destructive influence in biology, psychology
and sociology and has falsified our Whole outlook far beyond the domain of
science.
To a substantial degree the social scientist is himself a product of the very
forces he wishes to study. Long before he has received his professional training
he is exposed to such phenomena as class, race, family structure, money, prices,
religion, industry, politics, work, the messages of the media on all of these
subjects, and more. His perspective of the world is largely a cumulative result
of his role as a child, student, sibling, husband, consumer, professor, rich man,
black, woman, mother, and so on. All of these roles have defined the bound-
47. See generally P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966); T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA
(1936); R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1949); R. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SCIENCE (1973); M. POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (1958); K. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (1972); Y. Elkana, Rationality and Scientific Change, 1972 (unpublished
manuscript at Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Hebrew University, Jerusalem);
Y. Elkana, The Theory and Practice of Cross-Cultural Contacts, 1972 (mimeograph at Hebrew
University, Jerusalem).
48. M. POLANYI, supra note 47, at vii.
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aries of experience which in turn mold his social reality. 49 In a more specific
sense, the social scientist who studies the effects of schooling on achievement
has been socialized to a large degree by his own particular experiences during
his education. His knowledge about the determinants of poverty is influenced
by his own class origins and experiences. His image of political reality is con-
ditioned by his own interactions with the political system and other institutions
that inculcate political attitudes. Interacting with these influences is his profes-
sional training which emphasizes particular metaphysical and epistemological
frameworks for viewing the world.
Moreover, since researchers are not randomly assigned to studies, the ef-
fects of the researcher's commitment and ideology on the interpretation of
research findings is not a chance event. To the contrary, there is a self-selection
of problems by researchers according to their predilections, as well as the
selection by government and other decision makers, based upon the "outlook"
of the researcher and the sponsoring agency. Social science investigators choose
those problems that interest them and to which they feel they can contribute
something of value. Of course, research support is also a prerequisite, but most
social science analysts-particularly in the academic setting-have a choice of
problems on which to focus. Public policy-oriented research has a substantive
or topical component that may or may not be of interest to potential inves-
tigators. Such motives as a sincere wish of the individual to improve govern-
ment decision-making are often strong factors in the choice of problems, but
they also coincide with a deep personal involvement in the outcome of the
study. That is, the researcher is likely to have relatively strong viewpoints about
what proper policy should be in advance of his research.
The agencies that support research are just as likely to select a researcher
on the basis of his values as on his "scientific" competence. As Paul Samuelson
has remarked:5 0
The leaders of this world may seem to be led around through the nose by their
economic advisers. But who is pulling and who is pushing? And note this: he
who picks his doctor from an array of competing doctors is in a real sense his
own doctor. The Prince often gets to heat- what he wants to hear.
It would be inconceivable to think of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights hiring a researcher for his neutrality on the desegregation issue. In-
deed, we expect that government decision makers seek out those investigators
who are sympathetic to the agency's own orientation.
Obviously, these phenomena dovetail very closely with the use of social
science evidence in the courts. Legal proceedings are endeavors in advocacy,
each side seeking that "evidence" which will support its own position. There is
always some social science evidence on virtually any phenomenon, so one must
49. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, supra note 47.
50. Sainuelson, Economists and the History of Ideas, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 17 (1962).
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ask what types of evidence are likely to be drawn into the courts. I assert that
the social science evidence which courts are likely to receive has the following
attributes: (1) It tends to be based upon complex, statistical methodologies
that are generally beyond the experience and the competence of the court to
question. (2) It directly supports or refutes the matter under consideration.
(3) It is based upon a theory which is credible and understandable to the court.
(4) And, finally, it implies a remedy that is readily within the court's power
and is politically feasible.
The first requirement evolves from the image that the layman has of sci-
ence. "Good" social science is characterized by large data sets, complicated
statistical methodologies, and an aura of technical competence. While the re-
searcher has made many personal judgments with respect to his formulation of
the problem-selection of a framework for the analysis, definition and mea-
surement of variables, technique of data analysis and interpretation of re-
sults-all will tend to be obscured by what appears to be a strictly technical
analysis. The greater the methodological sophistication, the more difficult it is
to demystify the analysis and the more tempting it becomes to see "the
emperor's new clothes." The bias in favor of sophisticated empirical studies also
rules out the consideration of hypotheses that are not conducive to empirical
evaluation.
The second requirement suggests that ambiguity in research findings will
be shunned. Alternative interpretations of the results can obviously be danger-
ous to the advocate who uses the evidence to support his client's case. Thus,
the social science research that is utilized must unequivocally support the par-
ticular objectives of the advocate. This tends to eliminate any opportunity for
a thoughtful analysis of all of the competing hypotheses.
The third requirement, that the social science evidence presented to the
court be based upon a credible hypothesis, is illustrated by the fact that while
social science research in the Marxian tradition may be both extremely sophis-
ticated and unambiguous, the theory upon which it is based may not be ac-
ceptable to those heavily indoctrinated with the capitalist viewpoint.
Another example: no evidence has been presented in either the desegre-
gation or the school finance cases that argues in favor of the noncognitive
worker characteristics hypothesis as an explanation of the effects of schools
on the life attainments of children from low income and racial minority back-
grounds., t To the educated layman the cognitive skills theory is much more
credible than the noncognitive one.
51. But cf. Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. t.. Apt. 10, 1974). It that case,
conflicting evidence was introduced on the proper test to be af)t)lied in determining the quality of
education existing within a school dist'it defendants urging the "putpil-achievenint standard"
while the plaintiffs urged a "school-district-offering standard." Id. at 52. 1-le (ontrolling dispute
did not focus oni the relationship between non(ognitive theories of ed utati(on and life ,lainntini.
and much of the opinion was cast in temiS of the skills and cognitive achievemetc hypothesis. See,
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Finally, the requirement that the social science evidence presented to the
court implies a remedy that is both within the court's remedial powers and is
politically feasible, is illustrated, for example, by the fact that given the present
institutional framework, it is not possible for the court to interfere with family
child-rearing for educational purposes. Yet studies have shown that such
interventions will improve the life chances of students from low income
families.
52
In light of these principles it is understandable that the courts and other
policy makers have focused primarily on the cognitive skills approach. Firstly,
the research in this area, beginning with the Coleman Report5 3 and the "Racial
Isolation" report of The U. S. Commission on Civil Rights the following year,
5 4
has the aura of being methodologically sophisticated and empirical. Enormous
data sets (about 650,000 students and 70,000 teachers comprise the Coleman
Report data), sophisticated methodologies such as multiple regression analysis,
and quantification of educational outcomes as reflected in test scores, create a
strong image of valid scientific endeavor. Secondly, these studies purport to
show unambiguously that socioeconomic and racial integration as well as cer-
tain school resources improve the test scores of low income and minority
students. Thirdly, educated men tend to believe that cognitive test scores are
important determinants of life chances because they are likely to attribute
their own educational and occupational success to their relatively high levels
of knowledge and skills rather than to "less rational" factors such as those re-
lated to family socioeconomic origins. Cognitive skills are an attractive basis
for constructing the meritocracy.55 Finally, implementation of the desegrega-
e.g., id. at 89. By holding for the plaintiffs, however, the court accepted the testimony that "Stan-
dardized achievement tests . . .are not appropriate for measuring the degree of attainment of
many of the educational goals of the State. The' "do not measure for progress in the affective
domain-a pupil's personality chatacteristics, interests and attitudes, interpersonal skills and
socialization skills." Id. at 91. In concluding that standardized test scores are not determinative of
the quality of an educational program, the court also adverted to the parties' stipulation to the
following:
That a child's self-concept can be improved by the educational process; that the educa-
tional process can reinforce a child's negative self-concept; that schools can, do, and
should, play a role in providing a child with acceptable social values and behavior norms;
that schools can, (1o, and should, play a role in equipping children with what it takes to get
along in a technological society: that schools can, do, and should, play a role in making
children better future citizens; that mans' components of a good education are not mea-
sured by pupil performance on achievement tests; that many aspects of a student's
capabilities and progress are not measured by performance on achievement tests; and that
the scope of skills measured by achievement tests is limited.
52. See, e.g., Bowles, supra note 14; Bowles, supra note 19; Hess, Shipman, & Jackson, Early
Experience and the Socialization of Cognitive Modes in Children, 36 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 869 (1965);
Oltm, Hess. & Shipman, Role of Motheis' Language Styles in Mediating Their Pre-School Children's
Cognitive Development, 75 SCHOOL REV. 414 (1967).
53. See J. COLEMAN, supra note 25.
54. See U.S. COMMISSION ON Civit, RICHTS, supra note 30.
55. See R. HERRNSTEIN, IQ iN THE MERITOCRACY (1973); M. YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE
MERIoTCRACY (1958); Bowles & Gintis, supra note 35.
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tion and compensatory education strategies implied by the cognitive hypothesis
are within the powers of the courts and educational decision makers.
V
EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
Thus far, it has been argued that the social sciences cannot produce conclu-
sive results that would support a particular educational strategy for improving
the life attainments of students from low income and minority families. Also, it
has been asserted that the evidence that does enter the courts or policy arena is
considered and utilized on the basis of factors other than its scientific "validity."
What are the implications of these assertions for the evolution of public policy
and the law?
There are three possible cases. The first is the happy one where the evi-
dence presented is somehow the "best" that is available. In other words, the
evidence is based upon the clearest attainable picture of the world and is
unequivocally better than that which supports alternative hypotheses on the
subject. It is not clear how this would happen but to the degree that it does
occur, it can be viewed as advancing the wisdom of the legal system. The
second case is a less benevolent one in which the social science evidence, while
representing just one among competing views on the subject, nonetheless car-
ries the day. To the degree that the results of the research are erroneous, the
use of social science may be harmful.
But in many ways it is the third case that is most interesting. Here social
science evidence is used to support both sides of a legal dispute.5 6 In educa-
56. In Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), judge J. Skelly Wright commented
on the utilization of expert social science evidence in an adversary proceeding:
Plaintiffs' motion for an amended decree and for further enforcement has now been
argued and reargued via a series of motions and written memoranda for one full year.
During this time the unfortunate if inevitable tendency has been to lose sight of the
disadvantaged young students on whose behalf this suit was first brought in an overgrown
garden of numbers and charts and jargon like "standard deviation of the variable," statis-
tical "significance," and "Pearson product moment correlations." The reports by the
experts-one noted economist plus assistants for each side-are less helpful than they
might have been for the simple reason that they do not begin from a common data base,
disagree over crucial statistical assumptions, and reach different conclusions. Having hired
their respective experts, the lawyers in this case had a basic responsibility, which they have
not completely met, to put the hard core statistical demonstrations into language which
serious and concerned laymen could, with effort, understand. Moreover, the studies by
both experts are tainted by a vice well known in the statistical trade-data shopping and
scanning to reach a preconceived result; and the court has had to reject parts of both
reports as unreliable because biased. Lest like a latter day version of Jarndyce v. jarndyce
this litigation itself should consume the capital of the children in whose behalf it was
brought, the court has been forced back to its own common sense approach to a problem
which, though admittedly complex, has certainly been made more obscure than was neces-
sary. The conclusion I reach is based upon burden of proof, and upon straightforward
moral and constitutional arithmetic.
Id. at 859.
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tional finance litigation, the constitutionality of state school finance systems was
challenged on the ground that they provided lower quality education for chil-
dren in low property wealth districts than for those in more affluent districts.
The defense relied upon social science research which, they asserted, indicated
no relationship between the level of expenditures and the quality of an educa-
tion program. The defense arguments were buttressed by the Coleman Report
57
and other research,5 8 tending to show that there was little or no causative effect
between educational expenditures and other measures of school quality and
student achievement. The plaintiffs countered with witnesses and research
that disputed the methodologies and data employed in the studies cited by the
defense, and which indicated a correlation between increases in educational
resources and improved pupil achievement.5 9 In some cases the plaintiffs won
the argument; 60 in others, the courts were unpersuaded." l
Even where both sides draw upon social science evidence and the court
decides between the two competing presentations, there is a possibility that use
of such evidence will tend to redefine the issue itself. Presentation of evidence
on the relationship between educational expenditures and cognitive achieve-
ment implicitly narrows the context wvithin which the effects of unequal expen-
diture patterns will be considered. While the two sides to this debate disagree
on the effect of school resources, both have accepted the view that standardized
achievement scores are the appropriate focus for exploring educational out-
comes. Since courts and policy makers generally find it easier to understand
a point of agreement than of contention, such points of accord have more in-
fluence on the assimilation of the policy implications of research than the con-
clusions of the research itself. Thus, much of the legal debate surrounding
the challenge to present methods of financing education does not address the
basic unfairness reflected by state arrangements to spend more on the educa-
tion of children in rich districts than in poor ones. Rather, the prima facie
inequities are ignored as the courts are tortured with the convoluted argu-
ments provided by social scientists about whether money makes a difference
for "poor kids. ' 62 It is unfortunate that the issue has now become framed in
57. See J. COLEMAN, supra note 25.
58. See generIlly, JENCKS; ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAl OPPORTUNITY, supra note 31.
59. See, e.g., J. GUIHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN, & R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY
(1971); E. HANUSHEK, EDUCATION AND RACE (1972); Bowles & Levin, supra note 31; Hanushek &
Kain, supra note 31.
60. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10, 1974); Robinson v.
Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
61. See, e.g.,Jensen v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, Civil No. 24,474 (Ind. Cir. Ct.,Jan. 15, 1973).
62. It seems inconceivable that prior to the Coleman Report a state would defend its arrange-
ments to spend more money foi the education of children in wealthy districts than in poor ones by
arguing that dollars do not affect educational outcomes. I believe that this assertion would seem
incredulous to a court. Common sense suggests that if higher expenditures make a difference for
children in wealthy districts, they also make a difference for pupils in poorer districts. At the least,
a court should question why a state sanctions such high expenditures in wealthy districts if such
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terms of whether additional expenditures for children in poor school districts
will raise their test scores. 61
A second example of the tendency of a tacit consensus among litigants
having a greater influence on policy formation than the actual research results,
is the controversy over the effects of school desegregation. Until the mid-
1960's, the case for racial desegregation was one that was based largely upon
the type of society one envisioned. 64 For those who equated a fair society with
the absence of racial separation, segregation of schools was contradictory. For
those who defined a fair society in other ways, racial isolation in the educational
system was of little consequence. The argument was primarily a moral one,
dealing with normative visions of the world. 65
With the advent of the Coleman Report and the 1967 Report of the U. S.
Commission on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, a new dimen-
sion was added. These studies attempted to demonstrate that segregated school
environments retarded the test scores of black children and other students
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. By 1972, serious questions were being
raised about the validity of the earlier findings. Reanalysis of the Coleman data
did not support the hypothesis that the test scores of black students were a
function of the racial composition of the schools. 66 A subsequent analysis of
several longitudinal studies of the effects of busing argued that the data do not
support the conclusion that racial integration of schools in itself will improve
the achievement levels of racial minorities and that there is at least some evi-
dence that harmful changes in attitudes take place.6 7
The results of this study were shocking " due to the fact that heretofore
there seemingly had been one point of agreement in the social science studies
on desegregation-that "[i]ntegrated education will enhance the academic
achievement of minority groups, and thereby close (or at least substantially
reduce) the achievement gap.' 69 Despite the very contradictory literature on
school desegregation, the case for desegregation was seen as hinging primarily
on whether it improves the achievement test scores of minority students.
resources are "wasted." 64. Hobson v. Hansen. 327 F. Supp. 844 (1971). where the court stated that
the defendants "cannot be allowed in one breath to justify budget requests to the Congress and to
the District of Columbia City Council b\ stressing the connection between longevity and cquality
teaching, and then in the next breath to disavow any such connection before the COLtt." Id. at 855.
63. See Carrington, Financing the Amnerian Dream: Equality and School Taxes. 73 Co iu m . L. REV.
1227 (1973).
64. See geneially Clark. Social PolicT. Power, and Social Science Research. 43 HARV. ED. REV. 77
(1973).
65. Compare Cahn. jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 150 (1955), with Clark, The Desegregation
Cases: C(ititisn oj the Social Scientists* Role, 5 VILi. L. RFNv. 224 (1960).
66. See Cohen, Pettigrew, & Riley, supra note 31. at 439-50, 356.
67. Atrtor. supra note 3!.
68. T he ci tics inoved i utiickly to question tile rite ria. statistical procedures. t Ioie of studies
reviewed. and other aspecis of the Armor analysis. Se Pettigrew. Usem. Nomand, & Sinith. supta
note 30. The repl to this criticism also (iickly follos\cd. See Arnior, supr note 23.
69. Armor. supra note 23.
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Rather than considering what kind of educational policy regarding school ra-
cial patterns is consistent with our democratic ideals, the issue seems to be
whether or not blacks and other minorities gain a few more points on a vo-
cabulary or reading test. This standard is far removed from the declaration of
the Supreme Court of 1954 that the separation of black children "because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. "70
At this stage, the issue has thus been cast in terms of the achievement scores of
blacks rather than in terms of the larger moral and human dilemmas raised by
segregated public institutions. There is little doubt that the research agenda
has framed the issue.
CONCLUSION
What is the proper role of social science in charting educational policy for
improving the life chances of low income and minority students? The answer to
that question is not clear. The question of the relationship between educational
influences and actual adult status addresses a very complicated area of social
and individual behavior. In particular, little is known about the effects of dif-
ferent school environments on human behavior, about underlying theories of
human productivity and its determinants in a particular social setting, about
the myriad of other influences that can intervene between the educational
strategy and the adult outcomes many years hence, and about the appropriate
measurements of even those factors that do seem relevant. Further, the fact
that experimentation as an empirical investigating tool is politically and practi-
cally infeasible limits severely our ability to uncover the true relationships.
Some observers may react to these conclusions by suggesting the social
science evidence in these complicated areas is likely to be so misleading and
value-laden that we ought to ignore it. 7 1 In contrast, some technocrats will
argue that the case against the ability of social science to validate the relation-
ships between education and life chances has been overstated and that rapid
scientific advances in research methodology will even nullify those anomalies
which have arisen. Both of these views assume that the social sciences must play
a deterministic role in contributing to policy or that they can play no role at all.
Yet, it may be the heuristic aspects of social science research which are most
useful.
Alice Rivlin has suggested that we acknowledge the development of a
"forensic social science," rather than pretending "to be part of the tradition of
balanced, objective social science in which the scholar hides (or claims to hide)
70. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
71. In Rodriguez justice Powell noted that in view of the division (If opinion among "scholars
and edCational experts . . . [on] the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between
educational expenditIrcs and the quality of' education," the jUdiciary should ref-ain front deciding
the issue. 411 U.S. at 42-43. See also id. at n.86.
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his personal biases, and attempts to present all the evidence on both sides of a
set of questions so that the reader may judge for himself. '7 2 Using the notion
of a forensic social science for addressing policy issues,7 3
scholars or teams of scholars take on the task of writing briefs for or against
particular policy positions. They state what the position is and bring together
all the evidence that supports their side of the argument, leaving to the brief
writers of the other side the job of picking apart the case that has been pre-
sented and detailing the counter evidence.
The problem with such an approach is that it assumes that all of the sides
will be fairly represented. But adversary proceedings normally are based upon
only two conflicting points of view.7 4 Moreover, the fact that the epistemology
of the social sciences itself limits the analysis to a specific set of hypotheses
(particularly ones that have readily identifiable empirical consequences) sug-
gests that the issue might be framed in an erroneous manner. Of course, this
type of bias can be avoided by permitting non-social scientists to enter the
forum to present their views and argue their evidence. It is not clear what
criteria would be used to select such witnesses nor is it obvious how one could
determine how many points of view should be permitted. It is also not clear
that the courts would attach great weight to "non-scientific" presentations. Fi-
nally, the court lacks expertise in selecting among alternative presentations that
are grounded in complex statistical procedures and highly technical
language.7 5 Of course, the court could hire its own experts for examining and
interpreting the evidence, but what guarantees the objectivity of the "wise men"
who advise the court? 76
Social science research can best be used to frame the issues and their conse-
quences rather than to obtain conclusive evidence on what is right and what is
to be done. This approach requires a recognition that while many aspects of
the world cannot be quantified or analyzed in a social science setting, such
factors should be considered along with the results of social science research. 77
It is not clear that utilization of social science research in this manner is consis-
tent with an adversary framework. Further, if social science findings increas-
ingly are used to create what appear to be technical issues out of essentially
moral dilemmas, this presents a potential social danger. The apparently in-
creasing reliance of the courts on social science evidence suggests that intensive
debate on these issues should be given high priority.
72. Rivlin, Forensic Social Science, 43 HARV. ED. REv. 25 (1973).
73. Id.
74. While in most school litigation expert testimony is offered by both parties to the dispute,
see, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10, 1974); in Robinson v. Cahill,
118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972), only the plaintiffs introduced expert witnesses on the
relationship between expenditures and achievement.
75. See note 56 supra.
76. And even if the court's own expert is "objective," by what criteria, for example, is he to
choose between two competing economic theories?
77. See Address by D. Campbell, supra note 4.
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